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1 INTRODUCTION  
On train data recorder (OTDR) offers an opportunity 
to understand the driver use of power, brake and 
safety systems during a journey. Despite the potential 
of OTDR data, it is not widely used to facilitate the 
automatic analysis of driver performance.  
 
This paper presents a train driver competency 
framework based on official documents and reflect-
ing the professional driving policies. It will also ex-
plore the use of OTDR data to quantify different areas 
covered by the proposed train driver competency 
framework to assess train driver performance aspects 
such as drivers’ use of safety systems and braking, in 
Automated train driver competency performance indicators using real 
train driving data 
R.A.H. EL Rashidy, P. Hughes, M. Figueres-Esteban, C. van Gulijk.  





On train data recorders (OTDR) are used within the GB Railways to collect data relating to train operations and 
the state of various train systems throughout a journey. These data include power and brake controller position 
and driver acknowledgement of signaling system warnings. This data could be used to assess driver competency 
but an assessment framework is required to extract the data sensibly. This paper proposes a train driver compe-
tency framework to define aspects that are related to train driver functions based on documents analysis, cab-
rides and informal interviews. It also explores the utilization of OTDR in the quantification of the train driver 
competency framework by introducing a number of indicators under each aspect covered by the framework. 
The proposed indicators demonstrate to how OTDR data can be useful in routine systematic checks and pre-
incident investigation, for example, identification of the deviation from recommended rules that may have 
safety implications. Furthermore, the data may allow for improved understanding of driver performance that in 
turn could allow the development of more effective safety management strategies. A number of numerical ex-
ample presented to illustrate applicability of developed algorithms. 
addition, to derive indicators to measure the vigilance 
level of a driver. 
 
2 AUTOMATED SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
In the UK, current practice for assessing driver com-
petence performance is in-cab riding by driver man-
agers. A number of train operating companies use in-
cab assessment to monitor drivers' operational usage 
of Driver's Reminder Appliance (DRA) (McCor-
quodale et al., 2002). In some cases, digital cameras 
implemented to record driver’s action but they tend to 
be unpopular (RSSB, 2004). These techniques have 
their merits in assessing the driver performance as 
they supplied comprehensive details about the 
driver’s behavior. However, drivers may behave dif-
ferently under observation, limiting the potential for 
independent driver assessment. Add to that, the time 
and cost traditional methods hinder their use for con-
tinuous monitoring. 
A number of research studies (Balfe, 2016; El Ra-
shidy & Van Gulijk, 2016; Walker & Strathie, 2014; 
Green et al., 2011) explored the advantage of using 
OTDR source in different areas such as station duties, 
driver assessment and interaction with warning sys-
tems. Green et al. (2011) introduced a number of in-
dicators to assess driver performance. They are: 
• The speed at which power Notch 4 (out of a total 
of 4 notches) is selected when accelerating;  
• The percentage of time in a braking sequence 
that the driver selects brake step 3 (out of a to-
tal of 4 steps);  
• The of the train as it traverses a Train Protec-
tion and Warning System grid (TPWS) ap-
proaching a Permanent Speed Restriction 
(PSR); 
• The speed through a PSR as a percentage of the 
maximum speed and the mean speed when the 
warning system (AWS) horn is received. 
• Erroneous events such as wrong-side door re-
lease and system trips such as TPWS brake de-
mand. 
These indicators are compared with the average 
performance of the whole population of train drivers 
to assess an individual’s driving performance in rela-
tion to the cohort of drivers. The study introduced in-
itial learning OTDR analysis but did not make use of 
all the available OTDR that related to the driver per-
formance. 
The aim of this paper is similar to the papers 
above:  to assess driver performance in relation to safe 
driving of a train but we propose a more comprehen-
sive framework.  
3 METHOD 
The method proposed in this work comprises of two 
steps, viz. developing a train driver competency 
framework and introducing a number of performance 
indicators to quantify elements of the framework us-
ing OTDR data. 
3.1 Train driver competency framework 
The framework is based on documents analysis, cab-
rides and interviews. 
Document analysis clarified the driver function 
and best practices in relation safe professional driv-
ing. For example, the professional driving policy (e.g. 
SWT, 2012; LM, 2009) was used to identify the rec-
ommended travel speed when approaching a red as-
pect and braking rules. The Rule Book - Train Driver 
Manual (GE/RM8000/train driver) was also used to 
identify rules that the driver should comply with such 
as the use of safety systems. 
To gain more knowledge about the driver environ-
ment and driver reaction under different situations, 
cab-rides were carried out. In addition, consultations, 
in the form of informal interviews, with a driver and 
a driver manager were conducted to discuss some op-
erational issues and clarify some technical points. 
Based on above processes the following aspects 
were identified: 
• The driver handling of trains; 
• The driver’s compliance with rules; 
• The driver's vigilance; 
Under each aspect, a number of indicators were in-
troduced, as presented in Figure 1, to facilitate the 
conversion of the conceptual framework to opera-
tional indicators that can be used to assess each as-
pect. Train handling aspect covers how the driver uses 
the brake system and the power system whereas com-
pliance deals with rules in relation to driver’s han-
dling safety systems. The vigilance level of the driver 
has been assessed by a number of TPWS brake de-
mands, wrong-side door release and percentage of in-


















Figure 1. Train driver competency framework. 
 
3.2 Train driver performance indicators 
A bottom-up approach was implemented to develop 
train driver competency performance indicators 
(DCPIs) based on driver competency framework us-
ing OTDR data. 
3.2.1 OTDR Data 
The OTDR data files used in this paper were supplied 
by Southern Railway. They are for the same route and 
the same day but different drivers to eliminate the im-
pact of route conditions.  
3.2.2 Initial Data Handling 
The initial data handling process, presented in Figure 
2, includes a number of steps as follows: 
 Examine data types and format and correct 
them if needed. For example, the format of a 
relative journey time is converted from “+ 
01h24mn26s6” to “5066.6” seconds.  
 Compress all variables that occurred at the 
same time in a single data row. Closer inspec-
tion of the data showed a relative journey time 
record may appear more than once with dif-
ferent groups of variables (i.e. for the same 
time record, there was more than one input 
line from different data channels). 
 Processing missing data using different logi-
cal processes, for example, filling the missing 
values of train distance with calculated dis-
tance based on the available time duration and 
train speed. This error checking is specific to 
the Class 455 data used in this study, although 
it is likely that all OTDR data will need simi-
lar error handling and cleaning routines to 
make it useable. 
After this pre-processing, data analysis could com-
mence.  
3.2.3 Detection Algorithms 
A number of algorithms have been developed in the 
R software package to extract relevant indicators for 
each behavior aspect presented in Figure 1.  
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
A number of algorithms have been developed in R to 
identify relevant scenarios for each behavior aspect 
presented in Figure 1 and, then, calculate the metric. 
The metrics are mostly the frequency, the averaging 
or maximum or minimum values. A number of stand-
ard statistical visualizations were used to present the 
results such as boxplots.  
 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Proposed DCPIs 
Table 1 a, b and c summarize DCPIs that developed 
in this work and shows the proposed performance 
metric and criteria for each indicator assessment.  
 
Table 1. DCPIs based on OTDR data. 





Pattern recognition based on braking 
curve data 
Use of brake-
step 3 on ap-
proach to 
stations.  
The maximum percentage of distance 
travelled using brake-step 3 per station 
during a journey. 
Use of brake 
on approach 
to stations. 
The percentage distance travelled using 
each brake-step.  
Speed 
The speed at AWS horn (mph) 
prior to a red aspect 
The frequency of train speed <= 3 mph 




The percentage of distance travelled using 
power notches 1 to 4 (out of 4). 
* AWS stand for Automatic Warning System. 
 
(b) Compliance with rules 
Aspect Metric 
Use of EBS* 
Use of TPWS* 
Use of DRA* in front of a 
red aspect. 
Use of DRA at the start of a 
journey 
Use of DRA during the 
coupling/ uncoupling 
activity 
EBS operated event, 
TPWS isolated events, 
The number of DRA 
operated event comparing 
with, a number of red 
aspects the driver 
experienced. 
Putting the brake controller 
into Step 3 once the train is 
at Stand.  
Number of Step 3 at stand 
compared with number of 
station and red aspect 
during a journey 
Brake test before the first 
station and the first caution 
aspect. 
The use of brake prior to the 
first station or an AWS 
horn. 
 
* EBS, TPWS and DRA stand for Emergency Bypass 
Switch, Train Protection and Warning System, and Driv-






Instant cancellation of 
AWS horn 
The percentage of instant 
AWS cancellation 
Wrong side door re-
lease 




Number of TPWS Demand 
application 
 
4.2 Safety related DCPIs examples  
This section gives a few numerical examples of 
DCPIs that can be related to safety rules or devices to 
illustrate the use of OTDR rather than detecting any 
trend or best practice rule due to the size of the used 
data sample. 
Under the train handling aspect, braking behavior 
and speed at AWS horn approaching a red aspect are 
presented here as they are directly related to safety. 
For braking behavior, Figure 2 shows the percentage 
of each brake step use calculated by considering the 
travelled distance using each step. For example, in 
“Journey 5 “ the driver applied Step 2 (0.66) in addi-
tion to using Step 3 (0.28) as shown in Figure 2 due 
to the late use of the brake which may create a hazard 
condition under different circumstance such as low 
adhesive condition. It should be noted that use of 
brake Step 3 should be minimized, as a good practice 















Figure 2. Brake use for a pair of origin-destination pair. 
 
For the speed, Table 2 presents the speed at AWS 
horn when the driver approaching a red aspect. A 
higher than normal speed when approaching a red as-
pect may cause a SPAD (signal passed at dangerous 
without authorization) or lead to a full brake applica-
tion to stop the train at the correct location. For one 
train operator this is 20 meters in advance of the red 
aspect (LM, 2009). For the OTDR sample used in this 
paper all driver complied with this rule as showed in 
Table 2. 




 Number of 
red aspects 
Maximum train Speed 
approaching a red as-
pect 
Journey 1 0 NA* 
Journey 2 2 11 
Journey 3 1 14 
Journey 4 1 11 
Journey 5 1 14 
Journey 6 2 13 
Journey 7 1 14 
*The driver did not have any red aspect signal during 
his/her journey 
 








% Of Emergency brake % Of Step3
% Of Step2 % Of Step1
Under compliance with rules, braking test is 
checked as the brake test enables the driver to evalu-
ate the performance of train braking system prior to 
the need to use it. Using OTDR data enables checking 
this rule prior to the driver first stop (due to a station 
or a red aspect). For example, Figure 3 shows that the 
driver carried out the brake test prior to the first AWS 
horn, in contrast, the driver presented by  




Figure 4. No brake test before stopping prior to the first AWS 
horn. 
For vigilance aspect, wrong-side door release is presented. Re-
leasing the doors on the wrong side of the train may have serious 
consequences as it could cause a potential harm to railway pas-
sengers. Only one of the journeys showed any instances that ap-
peared to have wrong-side door release. This journey is shown 
in Figure 5 and is unusual in that the train appears to be station-
ary for most of the time. It is possible that this file shows a train 
under maintenance.  
 
 
Figure 5 shows door releases; on each occasion the 
right-hand side door (shown by the blue circles) is re-
leased shortly before the left-hand side door (shown 
by the red line). Because of the very short period be-
tween the two door releases, they appear to occur at 
the same time in the figure. Whilst this file does not 
appear to show an instance of an actual hazard – since 
the train did not appear to be moving – it nevertheless 
demonstrates that it is possible to use OTDR data to 




Figure 5. Wrong side door release. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Considering the growing interest in harvesting data 
sources such as OTDR, the development of DCPIs 
that support that direction is essential. DCPIs pro-
posed in this paper developed not only based the 
available data from OTDR but also supported by the 
official documents such as Rule Book and number of 
professional driving policy documents.  
The technological approach described offers sen-
sible solutions for the extraction of DCPIs from 
OTDR; it offers rapid analysis of the driver perfor-
mance in contrast to in-cab-riding assessment by a 
driver manager that normally takes place every six 
months and only provides the opportunity for a driver 
to be assessed under a limited range of conditions. 
Furthermore, the in-cab-riding assessment may cause 
drivers to behave differently under observation, 
whilst DCPIs can be calculated without disrupting the 
driver. 
DCPIs do not pass judgement about what is ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ but illustrate how data is extracted in a sen-
sible way from a huge dataset. For qualitative 
judgement, the allocation of indicators may need fur-
ther discussion in the implementation stage to con-
sider related parties point of view. 
A few numerical examples of DCPIs are presented 
to illustrate the practicality of using OTDR to calcu-
lated DCPIs. However, the used data sample was very 
small to detect any trend or best practice rule. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the train driver competency framework 
was introduced to outline the main areas of a driver 
function using documentary analysis (e.g. TOCs pro-
fessional driving policy and the Rule Book), in addi-
tion to interviews and in cab-rides. A number of 
DCPIs have also proposed to assess driver perfor-
mance under real-life conditions using OTDR data.  
OTDR offers great sources to develop a comprehen-
sive list of behavior aspects related to driver perfor-
mance that can be determined from OTDR data.  
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